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Abstract:  Quantifying uncertainty in the form of a probability distribution is a critical step in many 
managerial decision problems. However, a large body of previous work has documented pervasive 
overconfidence in subjective probability distributions (SPDs). We develop new methods to analyze 
judgments about variables which entail both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty and, in three 
experiments, study the quality of people’s SPDs in such settings. We find that although SPDs roughly 
match the aleatory concentration of the real-world distributions, people’s judgments are consistently 
overconfident because they fail to spread out probability mass to account for their own epistemic 
uncertainty about the location and other properties of the distribution. Although people are aware of this 
lack of knowledge, they do not know how to appropriately incorporate it into their SPDs. Our results offer 
new insights into the causes of overconfidence in real-world judgment domains and shed light on 
potential ways to address this fundamental bias.  
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1. Introduction 
People are too confident in the accuracy of their beliefs. For example, 90% confidence intervals 
contain the truth as little as 50% of the time—implying that judges are surer of their knowledge than 
they deserve to be (for an early review, see Lichtenstein et al. 1982). We refer to this as overprecision, 
which is one of several different types of overconfidence (Moore and Healy 2008). Overprecision arises 
when judges concentrate too much probability around their favored answer relative to their accuracy, 
underestimating the probability that the truth may be much farther away. Over the past quarter 
century, many studies across disciplines such as psychology, decision theory, and finance have shown 
that subjective probability distributions are typically too narrow and exhibit overprecision (e.g., Juslin et 
al. 1999, Soll and Klayman 2004, Teigen and Jørgensen 2005, Budescu and Du 2007, Glaser and Weber 
2007, Jain et al. 2013). At the same time, Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015) find that, when there is a 
distribution of values in a population (e.g., possible outcomes of 500 plays of a gamble), subjective 
probability distributions are less concentrated than the true distribution of outcomes. In this paper, we 
present new methods that allow us to reconcile this apparent discrepancy. The results offer insight into 
the psychological processes that lead to overprecision. 
The most popular paradigm for studying overprecision asks people to estimate factual quantities 
about which they are unsure, such as the weight of a Boeing 787 or the year in which Mozart was born. 
These types of questions entail epistemic uncertainty—doubt in the judge’s mind about information that 
is, at least in principle, knowable. The uncertainty arises from the judge having only partial information. 
For example, the judge may know that Mozart was a classical composer, and that classical composers 
lived in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. In contrast, with chance devices such as random number 
generators, dice, and coin flips, the best anyone can do is to specify a probability distribution of 
potential outcomes. For instance, the probability of rolling 7 with a pair of standard dice is 6/36, and the 
probability of rolling 6, 7, or 8 is 16/36. This is aleatory uncertainty—a representation of an outcome as 
inherently unpredictable, but with a knowable distribution of probabilities across instances.  
The two types of uncertainty have been shown to correspond to different reasoning processes, 
by which people conceptualize an instance either as drawn from a class of events (aleatory) or as a 
unique and knowable event (epistemic) (Fox and Ülkümen 2011). For example, most people think of a 
coin flip as an exemplar belonging to a class of possible flips, in which there are two types of outcomes, 
equally likely. Uncertainty is aleatory because, from the perceiver’s point of view, either outcome can 
potentially occur. In principle, though, the outcome of a coin flip could be represented as a unique 
event, in which uncertainty is epistemic: It arises from a lack of knowledge of the precise physical forces 
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operating in the moment on that particular coin. In contrast, most people would consider Mozart’s birth 
date to be a unique instance. The uncertainty here is epistemic because it corresponds to an assessment 
of one’s degree of knowledge. People would likely ask themselves “How much do I know about 
Mozart?” as opposed to thinking about Mozart’s birth date as a random draw from the distribution of 
birth dates of classical composers. Different types of events may evoke thoughts of aleatory uncertainty, 
epistemic uncertainty, or both, depending on factors such as repeatability (e.g., Mozart can only be born 
once) and the recognition of the role of chance in producing outcomes (Nisbett et al. 1983).   
In a series of papers, Fox, Ülkümen, and their colleagues examine the distinction between 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Tannenbaum et al., 2017; Ülkümen et al. 
2016). It is similar to the distinction between case-based reasoning, which involves thinking about the 
causal propensities and attributes of a specific target, and class-based reasoning in which people 
calculate relative frequencies or imagine a distribution of possibilities (Howell and Burnett 1978; 
Peterson and Pitz 1988; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Gigerenzer 1994; Teigen 1994). There are, 
however, two additional features that make the aleatory-epistemic distinction especially well-suited to 
our purposes. First, epistemic versus aleatory uncertainty captures the distinction between an 
impression of one’s own lack of knowledge and an impression of randomness in the world. Second, a 
given judgment problem can include elements of each. It is not a dichotomy, but rather a continuum 
ranging from pure aleatory uncertainty (e.g., a game of chance) to pure epistemic uncertainty (e.g., a 
trivia question). 
Many important decisions involve both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. How much to save 
for retirement depends on how long one will live. The decision to invest in a startup venture depends on 
the probability that the business will survive and its long term-profitability. Whether to undergo a 
complicated surgery depends on the likelihoods of different potential outcomes for the patient. An 
individual who needs to specify one of these probability distributions would do well to think about 
probabilities or relative frequencies within a reference class of similar events, which is an aleatory 
representation. For instance, when planning for retirement it is useful to know how long others like you 
have lived. When valuing a startup, it is helpful to know the three-year failure rate of similar 
entrepreneurial ventures. Yet there are important elements of epistemic uncertainty in these judgments 
as well, and individuals may have varying degrees of idiosyncratic knowledge about a particular variable. 
For example, a doctor judging the probabilities of different surgical results may combine specific 
information from a patient’s medical history with knowledge of the base rates of different outcomes. 
Epistemic uncertainty can also arise because the judge is uncertain about what the relevant probability 
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distribution is. The medical literature may offer limited or conflicting data about complication rates, 
leading to uncertainty in the doctor’s mind about the base rates of those outcomes. 
Studying beliefs about aleatory uncertainty necessitates having a distribution of possible 
answers against which to compare participants’ responses. Rather than focusing on purely aleatory 
events, we introduce an epistemic component by examining beliefs about everyday domains with which 
participants might be imperfectly familiar, such as commute times, housing values, and temperatures. 
These events all have an aleatory component—for example, it is natural to think of a distribution of 
home prices in Chicago. The epistemic component arises because an individual may not know the 
distribution for sure, but rather have an imperfect impression of it. This combination of aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainty contrasts with the kinds of uncertainty studied in most of the prior literature, 
where epistemic uncertainty predominates and there is no empirical distribution to compare to (to wit, 
unless we invoke parallel universes, there is no distribution of Mozart’s birth date). Furthermore, we 
introduce a novel methodology that takes advantage of this partition of uncertainty into aleatory and 
epistemic components, and affords an opportunity to gain new insights into the psychology that 
underlies overprecision in judgment.  
2. Two Standards for Subjective Probability Distributions 
In our studies, we ask people to estimate a distribution of probabilities for a member of a class 
of events, objects, or people. For example, we ask, “If we were to randomly choose one person from 
Philadelphia with a full-time job, what would be their average daily commute time?” A judge could 
believe that it is more likely to find a person who commutes between 20 and 30 minutes each way than 
one who commutes 0 to 10 minutes or 90 to 100 minutes, and so on. We are interested in the question 
of whether subjective probability distributions (SPDs) like this are, on average, the right shape. That is, 
are probabilities systematically overly concentrated in a few favored ranges (i.e., too narrow), too 
dispersed across many ranges (i.e., too wide), or about right? In making such comparisons, two different 
standards apply.   
When the researcher knows the true distribution of probabilities (as we do thanks to data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau) it is possible to compare the concentration of the reported subjective 
distribution to that of the empirical distribution. There is limited research on this topic, but two sets of 
studies suggest that subjective distributions could be more dispersed than the corresponding empirical 
distributions. Nisbett and Kunda (1985) asked one group of college students to report their own 
attitudes (e.g., opinion of Ronald Reagan as president) and behaviors (e.g., frequency of going to 
concerts) and another group to estimate the distribution of one hundred of their peers’ answers to 
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those same questions. They found that the standard deviations of the estimated distributions were on 
average about 10% greater than the empirical ones. Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015) compared 
subjective and objective distributions for the outcomes of various randomizing devices. For example, 
they used a Galton Board wherein a ball dropped from a slot at the top of the machine bounces over a 
series of staggered pegs to land in a bin at the bottom, producing a binomial distribution. Similar to the 
Nisbett and Kunda result, subjective distributions for the Galton board as well as other binomial 
distributions were more dispersed than the objective ones.  
Alternatively, we can compare the expressed probabilities of finding a member in a given range 
or set of ranges to the actual probability of finding a member in that range. That is, the judge might 
assign 25% probability to finding a commuter in the 20-30 range, when in fact only 15% of commuters 
fall in that range. As noted earlier, a large body of previous research is consistent in finding that 
subjective judgments tend to be overprecise. That is, judges tend to express too much confidence that 
the target estimate will fall within a given range. Using this standard with their randomizing devices, 
Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015) found that participants’ confidence intervals were too narrow. In other 
words, they observed that SPDs fell in between two standards—they were wider than the objective 
distribution, but not wide enough to be well calibrated. 
Moore et al. interpreted these results as paradoxical, but the difference can be understood in 
terms of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. In judging subjective probabilities of a range of possible 
events, people should consider both. They should consider that, within a class of events, individuals vary 
along any given measure (e.g., people have different incomes), and they should also consider that they 
have less-than-perfect knowledge of what that distribution is. People may misestimate the extent to 
which exemplars are concentrated in a narrow range vs. spread across a wide range (e.g., the degree of 
income inequality in a given city). They may also misestimate the central tendency of the distribution 
(e.g., the median income in that city). This combination of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty means 
that, to be well-calibrated, a judge must provide a wider distribution than the one the U.S. Census 
Bureau knows (with minimal epistemic uncertainty). If judges respond to epistemic uncertainty, but 
insufficiently, they might very well provide SPDs that are wider than the empirical distribution, but too 
narrow to be well calibrated (for a related explanation, see Camilleri and Newell 2019). 
3. The Present Research 
 We introduce a new measure, concentration, by which to compare subjective probabilities to 
each of these two standards. Concentration, which we define formally in the next section, measures the 
extent to which probability mass piles up in one part of the spectrum of possible outcomes versus being 
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spread across possible answers. We say that a subjective distribution is sub-concentrated if it is less 
concentrated than the objective or empirical distribution. Super-concentration reflects greater 
concentration in the subjective than objective distribution. Roughly speaking, sub-concentration means 
that a judge’s SPD is more spread out across possible answers compared to the actual distribution of 
outcomes. 
We examine several explanations, not mutually exclusive, for how overprecision might emerge 
from how people perceive and combine aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. First, people may believe 
that distributions of outcomes in the world are more concentrated than they really are—their 
assessments of aleatory uncertainty are too narrow. Second, people may believe that they know the 
empirical distribution better than they really do—they perceive less epistemic uncertainty than they 
should in order to be well-calibrated. Consistent with this, many authors have argued or implied that 
overprecision is the direct result of respondents’ failure to appreciate or to admit how much they do not 
know. When Alpert and Raiffa (1982) documented the low hit rates of subjective confidence intervals, 
they implored their subjects, “For heaven’s sake, Spread Those Extreme Fractiles! Be honest with 
yourselves! Admit what you don’t know!” (p. 301, emphasis in original). This quote also captures a third 
explanation. Perhaps people do perceive and appreciate epistemic uncertainty, but don’t recognize that 
they should therefore “Spread Those Extreme Fractiles!”, or they do so insufficiently. 
Testing for these three explanations requires us to develop better methods to assess the 
concentration of SPDs. To do this, we combine methods from two distinct domains, overconfidence 
research and population economics. Research in subjective confidence often has asked for X% subjective 
confidence intervals. However, these provide limited information about the full distribution. An 
alternative is the SPIES (Subjective Probability Interval EstimateS) method (Haran, Moore, and 
Morewedge, 2010), in which people estimate probabilities for given intervals, rather than reporting the 
interval size corresponding to a fixed probability (see also Goldstein & Rothschild, 2014). The SPIES 
method permits researchers to elicit detailed probability distributions by asking participants to assign 
probabilities to a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcome bins. Haran et al. (2010) show this 
method to produce better-calibrated subjective distributions, compared to earlier methods eliciting a 
single interval corresponding to a fixed probability. After eliciting distributions using the SPIES method, 
we repurpose a pair of well-established statistics used by population economists to measure the 
concentration of a resource across a population, namely the Lorenz curve and its numerical summary, 
the Gini coefficient (Gastwirth, 1972; Gini, 1912; Lorenz, 1905). We compare the concentration of SPDs 
with both the concentration of the real-world target distribution and the concentration needed to be 
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well-calibrated. Having a single measure by which to make both comparisons will allow us to distinguish 
among different potential explanations. 
4. Measures of concentration and calibration 
To analyze the results of our experiments we need appropriate measures of the concentration 
and calibration of an individual’s subjective distributions. The standard deviation of the subjective 
distribution might seem a straightforward measure of concentration. However, when judgments are 
grouped into categories, estimates of standard deviation depend heavily on assumptions about the 
distribution of values within categories, especially unbounded end-categories (“greater than __”, “less 
than __”), and on the shape of the distribution. The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient are well suited 
to measuring concentration when such details are not knowable. Whereas economists use the Lorenz 
curve to plot the degree to which a resource such as wealth is concentrated in a few hands or many, we 
use it to plot the degree to which a judge piles up probability mass in a few categories or many. 
In our studies, judges assess probabilities for each of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
ranges, or bins. To plot Lorenz curves, we subdivide the horizontal axis from 0 to 1 into equal fractional 
increments, with each increment adding another bin cumulatively. By definition, Lorenz curves always 
begin at (0, 0) and end at (1, 1).  Between those endpoints, the first increment in our plots represents 
the bin assigned the most probability, the first two increments represent the two bins assigned the most 
probability, and so on. The notation 3/5, for example, indicates the cumulative result for top three bins 
out of five. The vertical indicates the cumulative probabilities assigned to each subset of bins. We 
compare three different Lorenz curves and associated Gini measures, the details of which are best 
explained through an example. 
Figure 1 provides an example of Lorenz and Gini calculations for an individual who has provided 
probability judgments for the likely finishing time of an individual chosen at random from among all 
those who completed the 2016 Boston Marathon, which is the same as the distribution of finishing 
times. The individual’s responses appear in orange in the upper left panel. This judge estimated finishing 
times between 5:00 and 5:59 hours to be most likely, assigning a subjective probability of 0.38 to this 
event, and finishing times under 3:00 hours to be least likely, assigning this event a subjective 
probability of 0.05. 




Figure 1. Subjective, empirical, and calibrated Lorenz curves for a hypothetical judge estimating the 
distribution of finishing times in the 2016 Boston Marathon.  
Soll, Palley, Klayman, Moore: Overconfidence in probability distributions  9 
 
The judge’s Lorenz curve, plotted in the top right panel, is constructed by successively 
cumulating the subjective probabilities of the ranges, starting with the one judged most likely (5:00 to 
5:59) and ending with the one judged least likely (< 3:00). The steepness of the judge’s curve represents 
the degree to which the judge believes that some ranges are more likely than others. In the least 
concentrated possible distribution, each bin is assigned equal probability and the curve follows the 
identity line from (0,0) to (1,1). The judge’s Gini coefficient is given by 𝐺"#$%&∗ = ))*+ (2𝐽 − 1), where J is 
the area under the judge’s Lorenz curve and N is the number of events.1 𝐺"#$%&∗ 	equals 0 when each bin 
is assigned equal probability and equals 1 when all probability is assigned to a single bin. In the Boston 
Marathon example, N = 5 and J = 0.658, yielding 𝐺"#$%&∗ = 0.395. offers several advantages for our 
present purposes. First, it provides a pure measure of a distribution’s concentration independent of hit 
rates and accuracy. Second, by summarizing concentration into a single number in units of probability, 
Gini coefficients facilitate comparisons that speak directly to overprecision. Third, it is easy to compute 
with SPIES elicitations. 
Given data on the frequencies of each event, we can construct a Lorenz curve representing the 
observed distribution in the real-world data. This empirical Lorenz curve is generated by ordering the 
events from most to least likely according to their observed frequencies while cumulating these 
empirical probabilities. Letting E denote the area under this curve, the empirical Gini coefficient is given 
by 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ = ))*+ (2𝐸 − 1). The middle panel of Figure 1 displays the observed frequencies of 
finishing times in the 2016 Boston Marathon. Finishing times between 3:00 and 3:59 hours were most 
frequent, with 57.6% of runners falling into this bin. Finishing times over 6:00 hours were least frequent, 
with only 0.4% of runners falling into this bin. The corresponding empirical Lorenz curve is constructed 
by successively cumulating the observed event frequencies in decreasing order, yielding E = 0.776 and 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ = 0.689. The quantity 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  provides a measure of the extent to which the 
judge’s SPD is more or less concentrated than the observed distribution of events. For this judge, this 
difference is −0.294, with the negative sign indicating that the judge’s SPD is sub-concentrated—less 
concentrated than the observed distribution of finishing times. 
Finally, we consider a third Lorenz curve, constructed by cumulating the empirical frequency of 
events that fall into each bin as they were ordered by the judge. This calibrated Lorenz curve, displayed 
                                                             
1 Note that we apply an adjustment, 𝐺∗ = ))*+ 𝐺, where G is the standard Gini.  This is needed in domains in which 
the population is smaller, such as concentration of market share among companies (e.g., Collins & Preston, 1961) 
and concentration of crime in particular neighborhoods (Bernasco & Steenbeek, 2017). This correction keeps the 
Gini always bounded by 0 and 1 (Deltas, 2003). 
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in the lower panel of Figure 1, depicts the confidence levels that would be assigned to each of the 
judge’s cumulative bins by an imaginary judge named Calibra2 who knows the empirical distribution 
perfectly. The associated Gini coefficient is 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ = ))*+ (2𝐶 − 1), where C is the area under the 
calibrated Lorenz curve. Unlike the previous two measures, 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  can take negative values, ranging 
from -1 to 1. The probabilities in our example yield an area of C = 0.452 and 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ = −0.121. The 
quantity 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  provides a measure of the difference between the confidence the judge 
expressed in their subjective judgments and the level of confidence they were entitled to hold given the 
event order they had expressed. A positive difference indicates overprecision, meaning that the implied 
confidence intervals generated by sets of events that the judge deemed most likely were too narrow. 
For this judge, 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ = 0.516. 
Comparing subjective, empirical, and calibrated Gini coefficients corresponds to, and extends, 
other well-established measures of overconfidence. For example, we can use these differences to 
calculate a measure of global overprecision, representing the difference between the judge’s subjective 
probabilities and the empirical probabilities, averaged over the judge’s top 1, top 2, …, and top N - 1 
cumulated categories. In the Boston Marathon example, overprecision for the judge’s top category is 
0.380 – 0.078 = 0.302, for the top two categories is 0.630 – 0.365 = 0.265, and so on. If we average the 
four results for overprecision calculated in this manner, we find that global overprecision equals 0.258. 
More directly, global overprecision can be equivalently calculated according to H𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ I/2. 
These measures can be used across a variety of variable types (e.g., binary, continuous, multiple 
choice, ordinal) and elicitation formats. One caveat most be noted, however: The Lorenz curves can vary 
depending on the number of ranges used to divide up a continuous scale, and on where the “greater 
than ___” and “less than ___” end-categories begin. In the studies that follow, we mitigate this concern 
by comparing coefficients from comparable partitions and by using pre-existing, externally determined 
partitions when possible. 
5. Experiment 1 
Our first experiment had two main goals: The first goal was to test the generality of the finding 
by Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015) that judges’ subjective probabilities are less concentrated than the 
empirical distribution, but more concentrated than necessary for good calibration. The second goal was 
to test whether this pattern can be understood as a directionally correct, but insufficient, response to 
                                                             
2 The legend of Calibra was told by Soll and Klayman (2004). 
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epistemic uncertainty about the empirical distribution. Pre-registration materials for all of our 
experiments are available at https://osf.io/dt7cq. For Experiment 1 we pre-registered four hypotheses:   
• H1: 𝐺"#$%&∗ < 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ . As observed in the Nisbett and Kunda (1985) and Moore et al. (2015) 
studies, SPDs are less concentrated than the empirical probability distribution.  
• H2: 𝐺"#$%&∗  is higher when epistemic uncertainty is lower. SPDs are more concentrated when 
judges have more information about the objective distribution (e.g., its median or mode). 
• H3: 𝐺"#$%&∗ > 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ . Based on the well-established finding of pervasive overprecision, SPDs 
are more concentrated than they would need to be for good calibration. 
We hypothesized this pattern because we expected judges to respond to epistemic uncertainty in 
the directionally-correct way, by widening their SPDs in comparison to the empirical (H1 and H2), but 
they do that insufficiently, leaving them with SPDs that are still not wide enough to be well calibrated 
(H3). For many versions of “insufficiently,” we would expect the gap between 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ 	and 𝐺"#$%&∗  to be 
bigger when the gap between 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  and 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  is bigger. Thus: 
• H4: Overprecision, measured by 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ , is larger the greater the mismatch between 
the empirical distribution and the well-calibrated one, as measured by 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ .   
To understand H4, note that for a randomly chosen stimulus it must be the case that 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  	≤ 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ . A person with perfect knowledge of the empirical distribution would simply report that same 
distribution, so a judge with less knowledge would need to be less concentrated than that in order to be 
well-calibrated. The gap between 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  and 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  therefore measures how well one knows the 
empirical distribution, and H4 posits that those who have less knowledge about the distribution are 
more overprecise. This is a version of the hard-easy effect in the overconfidence literature (Klayman et 
al. 1999), which says that lesser knowledge (i.e., harder questions) corresponds to greater 
overconfidence.  
Because we were concerned about participants’ understanding of stochastic devices like the 
Galton Board used by Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015), we drew questions from five diverse domains of 
everyday knowledge. We approximated a representative sample of questions by selecting items 
randomly from well-defined populations in each domain. For example, one of the questions asked about 
the income of a randomly drawn household from a given city, selected at random from the 40 large U.S. 
cities in the Census Bureau dataset. We did this to reduce concerns that observed overconfidence could 
be attributable to the over-representation of tricky “contrary” questions—ones for which usually-valid 
information or intuition points to an incorrect answer (Klayman et al. 1999). 
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We introduced an experimental manipulation of epistemic uncertainty by telling some 
participants the medians of the population distributions (e.g., the median household income in 
Cleveland). We assume that this information reduces epistemic uncertainty, because one source of 
epistemic uncertainty is not knowing where to locate the distribution (and being aware of that). If 
people respond appropriately to epistemic uncertainty, their probability distributions should be more 
concentrated when they know the median than when they do not. 
5.1  Methods 
5.1.1. Participants. Based on a pre-registered power analysis, we aimed to recruit a sample size 
of 600 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk, split evenly between two conditions. Of the 973 
people who began the online survey, 324 failed to successfully complete the training, either by dropping 
out before completing the training and being assigned to a condition (127) or by completing the training 
but failing to meet the criterion for passing (197). Another 55 passed the training but failed to complete 
the study. Of the 252 excluded after completing training (197 + 55), 138 were in the provide-median 
condition and 114 in the no-median condition. This left a final sample of 594. Participants received a 
base payment of $0.50 and an average bonus of $0.55 for accuracy.   
5.1.2. Materials. Figure 2 shows what participants saw.  They reported their subjective 
likelihoods by adjusting the slider bars, which did not need to add up to 100. Rather, participants 
adjusted the bars to indicate the relative chances of an observation being in that category (e.g., a bar 
three times as long means that it is three times as likely). We normalized reported distributions by 
dividing each bin’s assigned likelihood by the total across all bins.  
For each domain, the spectrum of possible answers was divided into a modest number of 
response categories, as with the eight categories shown in Figure 3. As we noted earlier, Gini 
coefficients can be sensitive to the widths and number of categories. Accordingly, the number of 
categories in each domain was held constant.  Four of the domains use the 7 to 12 categories by which 
the U.S. Census Bureau reported data from the American Community Survey; for the fifth domain, 
average daily high temperatures, we defined categories in increments of 10 from 0 to 100 Fahrenheit, 
with end-ranges of “less than or equal to 0” and “greater than 100.”  
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Figure 2. Example question with responses from Experiment 1. 
5.1.2. Procedure. A practice item taught participants how to use and interpret the slider bars. 
They then took a 3-item quiz to make sure that they understood that longer bars represented greater 
chances, that the relative lengths of bars represented relative chances, and that the bars did not need to 
sum to 100. Participants had two tries to correctly answer each question, and had to answer all three 
questions correctly in order to be included in the analysis. In addition, participants who were provided 
with medians received a brief explanation of the median and a quiz question to test their understanding. 
However, to ensure that we could generalize the sample in each condition to the same population of 
participants, we did not exclude any participants based on this question. Exclusions left 310 participants 
in the experimental condition in which we provided them with medians and 284 in the control 
condition. 
Participants next learned that they could maximize their expected bonus payments by setting 
the bars to reflect their true beliefs. We told participants to “set the bars to reflect your true beliefs 
about the relative chances that a random observation will fall in each category. The more accurate your 
responses, the higher your bonus will be.” We did not provide them with the details of the payoff 
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formula.3  After the instructions and comprehension questions, participants saw one question from each 
of the five domains, presented in random order. For each question, and separately for each participant, 
a new city was randomly selected from all cities in the database, with the constraint that no city would 
be duplicated across the five questions. At the conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed and 
informed that we would deliver base payments within 24 hours and bonuses within one week. 
5.2 Results  
For each question provided to each participant, we calculated three Gini coefficients: 𝐺"#$%&∗ ,	𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ , and 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ . The means of these coefficients are presented in Table 1 and the 
results of planned analyses are shown in Table 2. The corresponding Lorenz curves (averaged across 
judges) appear in Figure 3. We hypothesized that judges’ SPDs would be less concentrated than the 
corresponding empirical distributions (H1), but more concentrated than a well-calibrated judge’s would 
be (H3). As shown in Tables 1 and 2, only the latter prediction is borne out. Global overprecision (the 
difference between 𝐺"#$%&∗   and 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  divided by 2) averages 0.10. This means that, averaging across 
all of the nontrivial points on the Lorenz curves (i.e., the top category, the top two categories, …, and the 
top N-1 categories), participants reported confidence that averaged about 10 percentage points higher 
than their accuracy. Moreover, the judges’ average Lorenz curves in Figure 3 lie entirely above the 
calibrated curves for every domain. This means that participants overestimated the probability at every 
level of cumulation—they overestimated the chance of finding an instance in what they thought was the 
most-likely category, the two most likely, and so on, for each domain. Contrary to prediction, though, 
SPDs were also slightly more concentrated than the empirical distributions, rather than less. However, 
the average difference between 𝐺"#$%&∗  and 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  is small (.031), and 𝐺"#$%&∗ > 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  in only 
three of the five domains—commutes, education, and incomes. This is apparent in Figure 3, where for 
those three domains the judge’s Lorenz curve sits entirely above the empirical curve.   
 
                                                             
3 Bonus payments were calculated for each question using an incentive-compatible extension of the 
widely-used Brier (1950) score. For each of the N categories c available for the question, we calculated 
the quadratic score the judge would receive if a randomly-chosen instance were to fall in that category: 𝐵= = ∑ (𝑰;= − ?̂?;)S);T+ , where ?̂?;  is the probability the participant assigned to category i and the indicator 𝑰;=  equals 1 when i = c and 0 otherwise. We then multiplied the quadratic score for each category c by 
the empirical probability 𝑝=  that a randomly-chosen member of the population would in fact fall in that 
category and summed those products to arrive at an average score for that question: 𝐸𝐵 = ∑ 𝑝=𝐵=)=T+ . 
The bonus earned was 20(1 − 𝐸𝐵) cents for each question. 
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Table 1. Gini coefficients in Experiment 1. 
Domain 𝐺"#$%&∗  𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  𝐺E>?;F<>∗  
Medians not Provided (n = 310)  
Commutes 0.367 0.309 0.088 
Education 0.411 0.346 0.161 
Home Prices 0.473 0.476 0.243 
Incomes 0.418 0.282 0.187 
Temperatures 0.514 0.600 0.380 
Mean 0.437 0.403 0.212 
    
Medians Provided (n = 284)   
Commutes 0.386 0.311 0.161 
Education 0.394 0.344 0.172 
Home Prices 0.464 0.488 0.340 
Incomes 0.401 0.282 0.198 
Temperatures 0.520 0.603 0.461 
Mean 0.433 0.406 0.266 
  Overall Mean 
Grand mean 
0.435 0.404 0.238  
 
Table 2.  ANOVA results for differences in concentration and precision in Experiment 1.  
  
𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  
   
Effect effect df 
adjusted 
effect df error df 
adjusted 
error df F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
a. Mean 1  592  1794.412 <.001 .752 
b. Domain 4 3.130 2368 1852.8 66.491 <.001 .101 
c. Information 1  592  41.286 <.001 .065 
d. Domain x Information 4 3.130 2368 1852.8 5.077 <.001 .009 
  
𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  
   
Effect effect df 
adjusted 
effect df error df 
adjusted 
error df F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
e. Mean 1  592  58.580 <.001 .090 
f. Domain 4 3.613 2368 2138.9 257.001 <.001 .303 
g. Information 1  592  0.649 .421 .001 
h. Domain x Information 4 3.613 2368 2138.9 2.464 .049 .004 
Note:  Adjusted degrees of freedom reflect the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violations of sphericity; the 
resulting p-values, reported here, are slightly more conservative. 
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Figure 3. Lorenz Curves from Experiment 1 
We also hypothesized that providing participants with the medians would lead to reduced 
epistemic uncertainty, which would manifest in more concentrated SPDs (higher values of 𝐺"#$%&∗ ).  
However, as shown in Table 1, 𝐺"#$%&∗  was nearly the same when participants were told the median and 
when they were not. At the same time, providing the median produced higher 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ .  That implies 
that providing the median did, in fact, reduce epistemic uncertainty: Judges who were given the median 
were more accurate in centering their reported distributions. Because judges with more information 
were more accurate but did not give more concentrated SPDs, they were better calibrated than their 
less-informed counterparts. 
We analyzed the Gini coefficients with two planned contrasts: 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ , which tests 
how the concentrations of participants’ SPDs compare to the concentrations of the underlying empirical 
distributions, and 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ , which tests how the SPDs compare to their corresponding well-
calibrated distributions. We analyzed each of these contrasts using a 5 (domain) x 2 (information 
condition) repeated measures ANOVA, with domain being a within-participant variable and information 
condition between-participants, representing whether the participant learned the medians of the 
distributions. Results of the two analyses, shown in Table 2, confirm the patterns observed in Table 1: 
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a) Contrary to Hypothesis 1, judges’ distributions are slightly more concentrated than the 
empirical, although the difference between 𝐺"#$%&∗  and 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  varies strongly across 
domains.  
b) Contrary to Hypothesis 2, providing the median had little effect on judges’ relative 
concentrations, with little variation across domains. 
c) In accord with Hypothesis 3, judges’ SPDs are substantially more concentrated than they should 
be to achieve good calibration, although the degree of overprecision varies with domain. 
d) In accord with Hypothesis 4, providing the median reduces overprecision, with some domain 
differences in the degree to which this is true. However, this is not because judges responded 
insufficiently to epistemic uncertainty. Rather, judges’ accuracy increased when given additional 
information while the concentration of their SPDs remained the same.  
5.3 Discussion  
In accord with much prior research, Experiment 1 shows that people are consistently 
overprecise, meaning their SPDs concentrate too much probability in too little of the spectrum. To be 
well calibrated, SPDs must be wider than the underlying empirical distribution, because they must 
reflect both the variability in the empirical distribution (aleatory uncertainty) and the likelihood of errors 
in estimating what that distribution is (epistemic uncertainty). Our results show that, across a variety of 
domains, SPDs are, on average, slightly narrower than their corresponding empirical distributions. More 
importantly, there are large differences among domains, suggesting that it is better to think of sub- or 
super-concentration as a characteristic of a specific domain of judgment rather than as any pervasive 
tendency.   
The experiment also sheds light on why SPDs are not sub-concentrated, as is necessary for good 
calibration. In the introduction, we posited three explanations: (a) On average, people might believe 
empirical distributions to be more concentrated than they really are; (b) people might be epistemically 
too certain–thinking they know more about the empirical distribution than they do; and (c) although 
epistemic uncertainty would demand that people widen their SPDs, people fail to do so. Our results are 
most consistent with the third explanation. On average, people are approximately unbiased in their 
impressions of how dispersed or concentrated outcomes are in the world; however, they do not 
understand that epistemic uncertainty means their SPDs should be wider than those impressions. Not 
only do participants give SPDs that are no wider than the empirical distribution, but when we 
manipulate epistemic uncertainty it has little or no effect on SPDs. That said, it is worth obtaining more 
direct evidence about whether people respond to epistemic uncertainty and, if so, how. People may 
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have intuitions about the effects of epistemic uncertainty that Experiment 1 failed to bring to mind, 
perhaps because the manipulation of epistemic uncertainty was between subjects. We designed 
Experiments 2 to make differences in epistemic uncertainty more salient and easier to apply.  
6. Experiment 2 
One reason why participants in our first experiment did not change their distributions in 
response to epistemic uncertainty may be that they did not think about it when assessing the 
distributions. In this study, we sought to increase the salience of epistemic uncertainty by varying, 
within subject, whether we provided the mode of the distribution. All participants estimated 
probabilities for a randomly selected exemplar drawn from each of six domains, in a procedure similar 
to that of Experiment 1. One group of participants was told the modal category for each of the six 
domains (mode-mode); another group was not given that information (nomode-nomode). A third group 
received the mode for the first three exemplars, but not for the last three (mode-nomode); a fourth 
group encountered the reverse pattern (nomode-mode). We predicted that losing or gaining information 
would make participants more aware of their state of knowledge following the change. Thus, if 
participants respond appropriately to epistemic uncertainty, but need to be prompted to think of it, an 
obvious change in available information should cue them to reduce the concentration of their subjective 
distributions when information is removed and to increase the concentration when information is 
added.  
For this study, we modified the materials of Experiment 1 in two ways intended to increase 
participants’ awareness to epistemic uncertainty. Instead of providing the median as in Experiment 1, 
we provided the mode as additional information. Arguably, the mode is more useful because it tells 
participants the most likely bin, whereas the median provides only a strong hint about which one it 
might be. Second, we asked participants for their “confidence” for each bin as opposed to for its 
“chances.” Because people associate the term “confidence” with epistemic uncertainty (Tannenbaum, 
Fox, and Ülkümen, 2017), specifically asking for this might prime participants to account for it. 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1. Participants. In this study, participants were assigned to a condition only if they 
successfully passed the training. Of the 1,166 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk who began the 
online survey, 430 failed to successfully complete the training, either by dropping out (79) or by failing 
to meet the criterion for passing (351). Another 23 passed the training but failed to properly complete 
the study (7, 6, 6, and 4 in the mode-mode, mode-nomode, nomode-nomode, and nomode-mode 
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conditions, respectively). In accord with our pre-registered design, analyses included the first 2 qualified 
participants for each of the 84 unique stimulus sets in each of the 4 conditions, for a total sample of 672.  
6.1.2. Design. Experiment 2 had a 2 (Round) x 4 (Information Condition) mixed factorial design.  
Round was a within-subjects factor. There were two rounds, each with three domains. We 
systematically varied the order of the six different domains using a Latin Square. Each of the six 
orderings was duplicated seven times using a different set of randomly selected cities for the six 
domains,  subject to the restriction that each city appear 12 or 13 times and never twice in the same set. 
We then duplicated those 42 sets, interchanging the rounds (i.e., questions 1-3 became 4-6, and vice 
versa), creating 84 sets of 6 questions each. Information condition varied between subjects: Participants 
received information about the mode in Round 1 or did not, and received information about the mode 
in Round 2 or did not.   
6.1.3. Materials and Procedure. We drew questions from the five domains used in Experiment 
1, and added a sixth domain, the age of a randomly chosen individual in a selected city. Participants 
received similar training to those in Experiment 1. They were informed that they could maximize their 
bonus by setting the bars to reflect their true degree of confidence. Payments were incentive 
compatible; participants received a base payment of $0.75 and an average bonus of $0.67 for accuracy.  
Base payments were paid within 24 hours of completing the survey, and bonuses were paid within one 
week.   
At the beginning of Round 1 of questions, participants who received the mode were told, “For 
the first three items we will provide you with some helpful information. We will tell you the most 
common category for the given city. Please click below to go to the first item.” Between Rounds 1 and 2 
they were told either “For the next three items we will continue to tell you…” (mode-mode condition) or 
“For the next three items we will no longer provide you with the additional information. We will not tell 
you…” (mode-nomode condition). For participants who were not given the mode, Round 1 began with 
just the instruction, “Please click below to go to the first item.” Those in the nomode-nomode condition 
received no additional instruction at the start of Round 2. For those in the nomode-mode condition, 
Round 2 was introduced with the same instructions given at the beginning of the mode-mode condition, 
“For the next three items we will provide you with some helpful information….”.  
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Figure 4. Gini coefficients in Experiment 2. Filled bars display 𝐺"#$%&∗ , hollow bars display 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ . The 
solid horizontal line displays 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ , which is constant across conditions because topics and cities 
were perfectly balanced. Purple bars with a solid border indicate responses with mode information 
provided to participants, gray bars with a patterned border indicate responses without mode 
information.  
 
Table 3. Repeated-measures ANOVA results for differences in concentration in Experiment 2  𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  
Effect effect df error df F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Mean 1 668 290.58 <.001 .303 
Information condition 3 668 0.28 .842 .001 
Round 1 668 21.69 <.001 .031 
Round x Condition 3 668 0.81 .489 .004 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  
Effect effect df error df F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Mean 1 668 2541.08 <.001 .792 
Information Condition 3 668 24.92 <.001 .101 
Round 1 668 8.91 .003 .013 












Mode–Mode No Mode–Mode Mode–No Mode No Mode–No Mode
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6.2 Results  
As in Experiment 1, we calculated 𝐺"#$%&∗ , 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ , and 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  for each participant’s 
responses in each domain. As before, we also analyzed two difference scores: 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗ , 
which compares the participant’s concentration to the empirical distribution, and 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ , 
which compares the judge’s concentration to the concentration needed for good calibration. For each 
measure, we averaged across the three domains in each round. The fact that the design was perfectly 
balanced meant that the average 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  was 0.376 in all conditions and rounds. The average Gini 
coefficients are displayed in Figure 4 and the results of a repeated-measures ANOVA for differences in 
concentration are presented in Table 3. 
As in Experiment 1, participants were on average super-concentrated: 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺89:;<;=>?∗  was 
significantly positive (M = 0.026). As shown by the solid bars in Figure 4, participants were less 
concentrated in Round 2 than in Round 1, but there were no effects of information condition.    
Overall, participants were also overprecise: 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  was significantly positive (M = 
0.185). This effect varied by condition and round. As shown in Figure 4, these findings reflect a 
consistent effect: There is a small, but statistically significant, main effect of round because, as noted 
earlier, judges were more concentrated in Round 1 than Round 2, whereas 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  was virtually the 
same (.245 and .241, respectively). There is less overprecision when the mode was provided. This is 
represented by the Round x Condition interaction: The effect of round depended on the presence or 
absence of information in that round. We followed up on the interaction with separate comparisons of 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗ 	for each round. In both rounds, 𝐺"#$%&∗ − 𝐺E>?;F<>∗  was greater without the mode than 
with it (M = 0.230 vs. 0.159, t(670) = 7.29, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .562, in Round 1 and M = 0.220 vs. 
0.132, t(670) = 9.31, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .718,  in Round 2). 
6.3 Discussion 
 The overall results are consistent with those of Experiment 1. Participants’ distributions were 
more concentrated than the empirical distributions. At the same time, the calibrated distributions were 
much less concentrated than the empirical distributions, reflecting the fact that participants were 
imperfect in estimating the shape and location of the distribution across categories. Both of these 
factors contributed to overprecision. Unsurprisingly, provision of information improved accuracy as 
measured by the concentration of the calibrated distribution; participants were less overprecise with 
the mode than without it. However, there is no evidence in our results that participants incorporated 
uncertainty about the distribution by having less concentrated subjective distributions. Even a strong 
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hint in the form of previously available information being taken away did not have a measurable impact 
on their level of confidence. 
7. Experiment 3 
In our third experiment, we sought to address remaining explanations for why people fail to 
properly account for epistemic uncertainty. To be well calibrated, judges must provide SPDs that are 
wider than they believe the empirical distribution to be. That requires them to appreciate that (a) the 
SPD is, in principle, different from one’s best guess about the distribution, (b) the difference between 
them involves epistemic uncertainty, and (c) the appropriate response to epistemic uncertainty is to 
make SPDs wider. A failure on any of these three prerequisites could underlie judges’ failure to respond 
to epistemic uncertainty.  
In this experiment, we sought to make the distinction between judgments of probability and 
judgments of concentration as clear as we could. Rather than elicit the entire belief distribution, we 
asked participants to focus on the single most likely bin for a randomly selected exemplar (e.g., the most 
likely bin for the commute time of a randomly selected working adult in Austin, Texas). We asked one 
group of participants (the probability condition) to choose the category that they believed was most 
likely for the exemplar, and then to estimate the chances that the exemplar would be in the chosen 
category. As in our previous studies, this estimate should take into account both the aleatory 
uncertainty (what proportion of the population is in the most likely category) and empirical uncertainty 
(the probability that some other bin is in fact more likely). We asked another group (the concentration 
condition) to estimate the percentage of exemplars in the most common category, whichever category 
that happened to be. Participants do not need to account for uncertainty about which category is 
empirically the most likely when answering this question. If, for example, the judge‘s best guess is that 
40% of Austin commuters are in the most common category of commute times, she should answer 40% 
to this question, even if she is uncertain about which category is in fact most common.  
Note that the difference between these conditions makes a strong normative prediction. 
Reports in the probability condition should be lower than in the concentration condition. In the case of 
zero epistemic uncertainty—that is, when the respondent is absolutely certain they know the modal 
category—the two might be the same. But so long as there is any epistemic uncertainty, the probability 
reported in the probability condition must be lower than the probability reported in the concentration 
condition. This prediction depends on participants understanding the experimental instructions. As we 
explain in the next subsection, we took a number of additional steps to ensure that people understood 
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the questions as we intended. We sought to reduce, in so far as we could, the possibility that 
participants merely misunderstood what we were asking for.  
If participants do distinguish between probability and concentration questions, do they also 
recognize that epistemic uncertainty is relevant to the difference? We gave some participants an 
epistemic prompt. Specifically, we asked them how confident they were that they correctly chose the 
most common category (probability condition) or could correctly choose the most common category if 
asked to do so (concentration condition). If such a direct prompt has no effect on judgments of either 
probability or concentration, it would suggest that judges do not see epistemic uncertainty as relevant 
to either type of question. If the prompt does affect either type of judgment, then we can observe 
whether the difference resembles the normative difference. That will provide evidence on whether 
people have any valid intuition about how to respond to combinations of epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainty.  
7.1 Method 
7.1.1. Participants. Our pre-registered research plan (https://osf.io/7b6m5/) called for a sample 
size of 960 participants from the ROI Rocket – ClearVoice online research panel. For this study, we 
wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that participants would understand the distinction between 
probability and concentration and be comfortable working with numerical information. All potential 
participants were advised in advance that they would have to pass a math quiz to continue to the main 
study. Only those who passed were randomly assigned to a condition; those who failed were shown 
their responses along with the correct answers and informed that they could not continue. About 60% 
of potential participants (1,682 out of 2,720) passed the test and were randomly assigned to a condition.  
An additional 131 participants in the concentration condition, and 140 in the probability condition, 
dropped out during the course of the study. Our pre-registered research plan set quotas for each cell (a 
unique stimulus-condition combination), so prior to analysis we randomly dropped participants in 
groups where quotas were surpassed until the cell size was as required. In addition to a standard base 
payment of $0.50 from the survey company, participants also received an average bonus of $0.87 for 
accuracy. Demographic information was available for 97% of the participants. Of these, 65% were 
female; their average age was 49.3 (S.D. = 11.8). 
7.1.2. Design. Each participant made probability estimate in response to six questions from the 
same set of domains and cities as in Experiment 2. Participants were evenly divided across the four 
between-subjects conditions in a 2 (estimate type: probability vs. concentration) x 2 (prompt: present 
vs. absent) design. Among those who received a prompt, half reported how confident they were that 
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that they had correctly chosen the most common category before they provided each estimate and half 
were asked after. Analyses that included the timing of the prompt showed no effects of that variable, so 
the analyses we report here collapse across the two timings.  
We created sets of questions using a Latin Square for the order of domains, and six different 
cities were randomly chosen for each order. We repeated this process 20 times using the same original 
square of domain orders but pairing with new groups of cities. This resulted in 120 unique sets of six 
questions; later, each participant would receive one of these sets. The total collection of 720 questions 
(120 sets times 6 questions per set) featured each of the 40 candidate cities in 18 of these sets, and no 
set included the same city more than once. 
7.1.3. Materials and procedures. The materials included screening questions, training 
questions, and estimate questions. The screening questions comprised five multiple-choice questions to 
assess numeracy (e.g., “Take 20% of 100, and then 50% of that. What do you get?”). Potential 
participants were required to answer at least four of five questions correctly. Those who did so received 
instructions appropriate to their condition, along with three questions to make sure that they 
understood the basic concepts of either probability or concentration and understood all the elements of 
the procedure. After answering each of these training questions, participants saw the correct answers 
alongside their own. (Consistent with our pre-registered research plan, participants were included in the 
sample regardless of their answers to these three questions.) Participants read that they should try to 
be as accurate as possible, and that they could earn up to an additional $0.20 cents for each of the three 
questions based on their accuracy.4 The screening and training questions are available in the 
supplemental materials (https://osf.io/dt7cq/). 
The estimate questions were like those used in Study 2, except that we reorganized the ranges 
of values in five of the six domains so that each question would have five total categories with three 
middle categories of equal width. For example, the ranges for commute times were < 15, 15-29, 30-44, 
45-59, and ≥ 60 minutes. These modifications served to simplify the task for participants and to make 
results for different questions more comparable. Since the education domain is categorical, we simply 
                                                             
4 Analogous to the payment scheme in Experiment 1, bonus payments were calculated for each question using an 
incentive-compatible extension of the Brier score. For each item, participants provided a probability judgment ?̂? 
(for either the category they chose, or the most likely category, whichever category that happens to be, in the 
probability and concentration conditions, respectively). We used the true probability 𝑝 for that particular question 
to calculate an expected Brier score according to 𝐸𝐵 = 𝑝(1 − ?̂?)S + (1 − 𝑝)?̂?S. The bonus earned was 20(1 −𝐸𝐵) cents for each of the six items. 
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reduced the number of categories to five (e.g., two of the original categories were combined into “Did 
not complete high school”).  
In the concentration condition, the estimate questions took this form: “In Atlanta, Georgia, what 
is the percentage of adult workers in the most common category of commuting times, whichever 
category that happens to be?” (Emphases were included in the actual stimuli.) Participants responded 
by selecting one of 21 radio buttons labeled 0% to 100% in increments of 5%. Those who received a 
prompt for this question were asked this either before or after each concentration question: “How 
confident are you that you could correctly choose the most common category of commuting times in 
Atlanta, Georgia.” They responded by selecting one of five confidence levels, ranging from “Not at all 
confident” to “Extremely confident.” 
In the probability condition, estimates were elicited using a two-part question, such as, “In your 
judgment, which of the five commuting time categories is the most common one in Atlanta, Georgia?,” 
followed by, “We’re going to select a working adult in Atlanta, Georgia at random. What are the chances 
that this person was in the commuting time category that you chose?” They responded using the same 
0%-100% scale as in the concentration condition. Participants who received a prompt were also asked 
(either before or after the probability question), “How confident are you that you correctly chose the 
most common commuting time category in Atlanta, Georgia?” They responded on the same 5-point 
confidence scale as described previously. 
7.2 Results  
We begin with an analysis of estimates, either of probability or of concentration, depending on 
the condition. We analyzed the data with a mixed model, with estimate type (probability vs. 
concentration) and prompt (present vs. absent) as the between-subject factors, and domain as within-
subject factors. Results are shown in Table 4 and analyses in Table 5. If participants complied with 
Bayesian norms, estimates should be lower for probability than for concentration. We observe a small 
main effect of estimate type in that direction, but it is not statistically significant. If judges are more 
Bayesian when prompted to think of epistemic uncertainty, that will lead them to lower their estimates 
of probability, but not concentration. Thus, we would see a main effect of Prompt and an Estimate Type 
x Prompt interaction. We find no hint of either effect. Naturally, estimates differ from one domain to 
another. However, we did not predict the Type x Prompt interaction. For four of the five domains, 
assessments of concentration are slightly higher than assessments of probability; the reverse is true for 
the temperatures domain.  
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Mass of Maximum Category  
Probability Condition 
Mass of Chosen Category 
Topic Reported Actual 
Sub/Super- 
concentration   Reported Actual 
Over- 
precision 
Ages 0.375 0.326 0.049  0.364 0.275 0.089 
Commutes 0.430 0.434 -0.004  0.412 0.257 0.155 
Education 0.426 0.297 0.128  0.409 0.247 0.161 
Home Prices 0.438 0.425 0.013  0.408 0.278 0.129 
Incomes 0.429 0.506 -0.077  0.404 0.281 0.124 
Temperatures 0.446 0.471 -0.025  0.461 0.344 0.117 
Mean 0.424 0.410 0.014   0.410 0.280 0.129 
 
 
Table 5. Repeated measures ANOVA results for Experiment 3 
Effect effect df 
adjusted 
effect df error df 
adjusted 
error df F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Mean 1  956  5555.37 <.001 .853 
Domain 5 4.667 4780 4461.7 36.68 <.001 .037 
Estimate Type 1    1.60 .201 .002 
Prompt 1  592  0.00 .956 <.001 
Type x Prompt 1    0.89 .346 .001 
Domain x Type 5 4.667 4780 4461.7 3.17 .009 .003 
Domain x Prompt 5 4.667 4780 4461.7 0.66 .644 .001 
Domain x Type x 
Prompt 5 4.667 4780 4461.7 0.22 .946 <.001 
Note.  Adjusted degrees of freedom reflect the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violations of sphericity. 
 
Thus far, we have established that participants reported similar estimates on average regardless 
of whether they were evaluating concentration or probability. We next compare their estimates to the 
empirical distribution to determine their estimates’ accuracy (concentration condition) and calibration 
(probability condition). In the concentration condition, we looked at the difference between estimated 
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and empirical concentration in a mixed 2 (prompt) x 6 (domain) ANOVA model. As in Experiments 1 and 
2, there was a slight tendency toward super-concentration, M = .014, F(1, 478) = 3.19, p = .075, 𝜂WS  = 
0.007. Not surprisingly, the domains differed from one another, F(4.31, 2058) = 91.04, p < .001, 𝜂WS  = 
0.160.5 However, as shown in Table 5, the tendency toward super-concentration was driven almost 
entirely by the education domain. The prompt had no bearing on super-concentration, F(1, 478) = 0.39, 
p = .531, 𝜂WS  = 0.001, nor was there a Prompt x Domain interaction, F(4.31, 2058) = 0.41, p = .802, 𝜂WS  = 
0.001.   
Next, using the data from the probability condition, we examined overprecision, the difference 
between the estimated and empirical probability mass in the category chosen as most common. Overall, 
participants overestimated the probability in the chosen category by 0.129, significantly different from 
zero, F(1, 478) =238.01, p = .001, 𝜂WS  = 0.332. Domains differed from one another in overprecision, 
F(4.56, 2180) = 10.14, p <.001, 𝜂WS  = 0.021. The prompt had no main effect, F(1, 478) = 0.73, p = .393, 𝜂WS  
= 0.002, nor did it interact with domain, F(4.56, 2180) = .44, p = .807, 𝜂WS  = 0.001.  
It appears from these findings that prompting people to consider their epistemic uncertainty 
had no effect. However, these are the net results across judges with different levels of confidence. 
When we take into account the judge’s degree of confidence in correctly identifying the most common 
category, a different pattern emerges, shown in Figure 6. We performed a regression analysis on 
estimates with estimate type (concentration or probability), confidence, and domain as independent 
variables, along with the Estimate Type x Confidence interaction6. Estimates of concentration increased 
somewhat with greater confidence about which was the leading category, b = 0.024, S.E.  = .012, t(479) 
= 2.00, p = .046. Estimates of probability increased with confidence more so, b = 0.097, with a significant 
Type x Confidence interaction, S.E.  = .016, t(479) = 4.66, p < .001. 
                                                             
5 Fractional degrees of freedom reflect the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violations of sphericity. 
6 Type was dummy coded with 0 = concentration, domain was effect-coded, and clustered standard errors were 
used to deal with the possible interdependence of multiple responses from a single participant.  
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Figure 6.  Relationships between confidence in identifying the most common category and estimates of 
(solid line) the probability of a randomly chosen item falling into the category believed most likely, or 
(dashed line) concentration, that is, the probability that a randomly chosen item falling in the most likely 
category, whichever category that is. Confidence in identifying the most likely category is not assessed in 
the no-prompt conditions (triangles).  
 
The results make clear that participants’ intuitions comply with normative prescriptions in two 
key respects: Their subjective probabilities are lower with greater epistemic uncertainty (i.e., with lower 
confidence about which is the most popular category, r = .336) and their estimates of the concentration 
are not sensitive to that variable. However, their intuitions are wrong in a way that explains the lack of 
overall difference between the two types of judgment. Judges violate the principle that the effect of 
epistemic uncertainty is unidirectional—probability judgments should only be lower than concentration 
judgments, or at most equal in the case of zero epistemic uncertainty. That is, the solid line should 
always be below the dashed line in Figure 6. Instead, a spotlight analysis shows that, although 
probability estimates were lower than concentration estimates when participants were “Slightly 
confident” (bcondition = -.068, t(479) = -4.62, p < .001) and “Not at all confident” about which is the leading 
category (bcondition = -.141, t(479) = -5.54, p < .001), the opposite was true when they were “Very 
               Probability with confidence prompt 
                Concentration with confidence prompt 
               Probability without prompt 
               Concentration without prompt 
Estimate 
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confident” (bcondition = .078, t(479) = 2.72 p = .007) and “Extremely confident” (bcondition = .151, t(479) = 
4.49, p = .001). When, in the probability condition, participants estimate the chance of finding an 
instance in their chosen category, their probability estimates are well calibrated with empirical 
probabilities only for those who are “not at all confident.” 
7.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 provides further insight into where judges go wrong when epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainty combine. Subjective probability judgments should take into account both the aleatory 
distribution of possibilities in the population and one’s uncertainty about what that distribution is. The 
presence of any degree of epistemic uncertainty means the judge’s subjective probability of an event 
falling in the specific range believed to be most likely should be lower than the judge’s best guess about 
the proportion of the population that is contained in its most likely range, whichever that happens to be. 
We find that judges do take epistemic uncertainty into account when estimating the probability of an 
event, at least when its presence is brought to their attention. With high epistemic uncertainty (i.e., low 
confidence about the population distribution), judges’ subjective probabilities are indeed less 
concentrated than they believe the population to be. However, their intuitions about what to do about 
epistemic uncertainty seem to be wrong in one important respect. With high confidence (low epistemic 
uncertainty), judges’ probabilities are more concentrated than their beliefs about the population. 
Intuitive judgments resemble an averaging of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, rather than the 
unidirectional combination a statistician would prescribe. 
8. General Discussion 
Managers are regularly confronted with decision problems involving variables about which they 
have uncertainty. To make well-reasoned decisions, they must draw on their knowledge and beliefs 
about these variables to quantify the likelihood of different outcomes in the form of a subjective 
probability distribution. Often, this representation of lack of knowledge about the variable involves 
elements of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. 
Most prior work on subjective confidence has focused only on epistemic uncertainty. Typically, 
there is a unique correct value (e.g., the year in which Mozart was born) and the only uncertainty arises 
from the judge’s own lack of knowledge. However, people often face a second kind of uncertainty: 
aleatory, due to stochastic processes (e.g., how long it will take to get to work today). Many situations 
involve elements of both. Testing beliefs about aleatory uncertainty lay bare the distribution of 
outcomes and allow for tests of how precise or concentrated reported belief distributions are, relative 
to the true distribution of possible outcomes.  
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8.1 Empirical contributions 
Our work provides insight into how judges take account of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in 
thinking about a distribution of possible occurrences. Judges have imperfect knowledge about the 
distribution of values within any class of items or events, be it commute times or temperatures or 
prices. Their best guesses about these distributions are never exactly the right shape and size, and in 
exactly the right location. And, of course, judges do not know exactly what their errors may be. These 
sources of epistemic uncertainty mean that they should not try to match their subjective probability 
distributions to the concentration of the empirical distributions. Rather, well-calibrated judges should 
spread out their SPDs to account for the range of possibilities for what the empirical distributions are.   
Moore, Carter, and Yang (2015) report that subjective probability distributions are less 
concentrated than the underlying empirical distributions, yet still too concentrated to be well-calibrated 
because they are placed, or centered, so badly. Our results suggest that, in general, people may be even 
further off the mark. Across a variety of more familiar domains, we found that SPDs were, on average, 
slightly more concentrated than the corresponding empirical distributions. This effect of super-
concentration is not consistent across domains, but the finding that judges’ SPDs are overprecise is quite 
robust in our data. 
We examine several different explanations for why this is the case. Across studies, we vary the 
level of epistemic uncertainty, sometimes very transparently, and we provide hints and cues to bring 
epistemic uncertainty to front of mind. None of those manipulations had any appreciable effect. It does 
not, however, appear to be the case that judges simply neglect to consider epistemic uncertainty. Yet if 
they are aware of it, why don’t they use their epistemic uncertainty to make their judgments of 
subjective probability less concentrated? Bayesian principles are notoriously unintuitive, so perhaps 
judges don’t know that epistemic uncertainty should affect estimates of distributions, or perhaps they 
don’t know how. Our final experiment favors the latter explanation. We find that judges do apply their 
sense of epistemic uncertainty to their subjective probabilities, but they have incorrect intuitions about 
how to do so. They spread out their SPDs in the presence of high epistemic uncertainty, but they 
concentrate them when epistemic uncertainty is low. Roughly speaking, judges seem to average 
different sources of uncertainty (aleatory and epistemic) rather than aggregating them (Soll 1999).  
This interpretation comports with Tannenbaum et al. (2017), who show that people map 
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty into the 0-1 probability scale differently. Pure epistemic uncertainty 
gets mapped into the full scale—people tend to use extreme judgments when they perceive that they 
have complete knowledge about a situation. In contrast, pure aleatory uncertainty gets mapped into 
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more moderate probabilities that reflect perceptions of randomness. Tannenbaum et al. suggest that 
people employ an intermediate mapping (i.e., an average) for situations that involve a mixture of 
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. We believe that this mapping error, combined with a tendency to 
overestimate one’s knowledge about the distribution, is a major contributor toward overprecision. 
8.2 Methodological contributions 
We introduce a new method for characterizing the concentration of a probability distribution 
which allows a researcher to evaluate both (a) the concentration of a subjective distribution relative to 
the empirical distribution and (b) whether the subjective distribution is overprecise—too concentrated 
to achieve good calibration. These assessments rely on comparisons between three Gini coefficients, 
each of which measures the extent to which the probabilities from a particular distribution coalesce 
around a specific set of outcomes rather than being spread evenly across all outcomes. Comparisons of 
subjective, empirical, and calibrated Gini coefficients provide a novel viewpoint on the relationship 
between the concentration and calibration of a subjective distribution, offering insights into the causes 
of overprecision that are not available from existing metrics such as absolute deviations and interval hit 
rates. Furthermore, each Gini coefficient is measured in units of probability, thereby allowing for 
standardized comparisons across different distributions with different units, which facilitates analysis of 
judgments from a variety of domains. 
 8.1 Limitations and future directions 
Our online samples provided greater diversity and larger sample sizes than would be possible in 
a laboratory. However, as with any online sample, there is room to be concerned about both their 
numerical sophistication and their motivation to be accurate. We attempted to address concerns about 
participants’ numerical sophistication by screening participants with tests of numeracy. However, we 
cannot be certain that the screening ruled out all relevant misunderstandings of necessary numerical 
concepts. We attempted to motivate accuracy by providing monetary incentives that rewarded accurate 
responses. Although the size of these incentives was in line with recent norms for online participants, 
we cannot be certain that those modest monetary incentives were sufficient to insure strong accuracy 
motivation. It would be interesting to examine the possible effects of larger incentives and more training 
in mathematics and statistics. That said, we are interested in how probability judgments are made in the 
general population, with an ordinary range of skills and effort levels.  
Like much of the prior literature, our experiments utilize assessments of probability distributions 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and numerical probabilities (Experiment 3). It has long been established that 
ordinary people misunderstand numerical probabilities (e.g., Fischhoff, 1991), and it is unlikely that 
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many people naturally think of uncertainty in terms of probability distributions. Thus, the elicitation 
methods we, and many previous investigators, use are unfamiliar to participants. Given how many 
decisions in life, from investment to clothing choices, depend on understanding probability and hedging 
risks, important questions remain about whether behavioral measures of certainty, such as choices 
under risk, might reveal more accurate intuitions (Mamassian, 2008; Mannes & Moore, 2013), and 
whether domain experts familiar with assessing risk are susceptible to the same errors when combining 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. 
We have focused in this paper on the difficulty people have in combining aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainty. The distinction may also shed light on other findings in the overprecision literature, which 
future research should investigate. For example, there is less overprecision when participants learn by 
experience rather a description of events (Camilleri and Newell 2019), and when participants forecast 
future values (e.g., stock prices) based on time series as opposed to answering general knowledge 
questions (Budescu and Du 2007). In both cases, the direct observation of data is likely to favor an 
aleatory representation of the problem, which based on our findings should reduce but not eliminate 
overprecision. Future research might also investigate the implications for the accuracy-informativeness 
tradeoff (Yaniv and Foster 1995), which says that people avoid very wide confidence intervals because 
they are unhelpful to the listener (e.g., “90% confident that travel time is between 3 hours and 5 days”).  
Epistemic representations seem more flexible in assessing how much one knows, and are therefore 
more likely to favor informativeness over accuracy.   
8.3 Conclusions 
Our work touches on fundamental questions about how people know what they know. We find 
that people’s estimates about a range of possible outcomes are systematically different from what 
norms suggest. Their probability judgments are overprecise, meaning that people underestimate the 
magnitude of their errors (Soll and Klayman, 2004). Subjective probability distributions do not properly 
reflect the degree of (in)accuracy in the judge’s knowledge. We can easily imagine our participants 
objecting to our characterization of them. How could we expect them to know what they do not know? 
And yet, an appropriate level of confidence requires the application of exactly that kind of 
metacognition. How to do so is not at all obvious. Statistical reality demands that uncertainty in the 
placement of a distribution widen the distribution of possible outcomes, but this reality is not intuitively 
obvious to most people, at least not to our participants. And people are unlikely to get the kind of 
explicit, timely, and plentiful feedback needed to learn that fact through first-hand experience. Calibra, 
the perfectly calibrated judge, is imaginary precisely because the conditions permitting perfect 
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calibration are imaginary. As long as there are things people do not know, it will be difficult for them to 
fully take the lack of that unknown information into account when calibrating their confidence 
judgments. 
Overconfidence in subjective probability distributions poses a key challenge for managerial 
decision making. Our analysis of variables involving both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty reveals 
novel insights about why and how judges’ subjective probability distributions are overprecise. Future 
research should build on these findings to improve judgments about uncertain quantities. Identifying 
ways to reduce overconfidence remains a fundamental question, and we hope that our work inspires 
new approaches that are effective at overcoming this pervasive bias. 
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